Understanding FUSE: what it is, what it isn’t The pull-down menu starts off set to Current Downloads - select either All Downloads or Deprecated Downloads to see the older releases. You can get to MacFUSE Core 0.3.0 through the Downloads tab at the MacFUSE page. Version 0.4.0 is too new to work with the user-friendly utilities you need to get started - including the SpotlightFS 0.1.0 and sshfs 0.3.0 packages. The newest release of MacFUSE Core is 0.4.0, but for right now, I recommend that you download the previous release. And it is OS X’s BSD compatibility that enabled Google engineer Amit Singh to write the FUSE kernel extension and library he released in January.Īt the MacFUSE project home page, you will find installer packages for the core MacFUSE utility and two FUSE filesystem modules: SpotlightFS and sshfs. Now you can do the same thing on Mac OS X, courtesy of MacFUSE.įUSE has never been limited to Linux, of course - FreeBSD has had it for years. Using FUSE modules, you can mount all sorts of innovative resources - Gmail, your Flickr photos, a remote SSH server - directly into your local machine’s filesystem and use their contents exactly as if they were normal files. If there are, then Apple Pay capabilities may be disabled.Filesystem in Userspace (FUSE) has long been one of my favorite features on Linux systems. The kext receipt is used by subsystems such as Apple Pay to determine whether there are any kexts currently loaded that could interfere with the trustworthiness of macOS. The AuxKC Image4 hash is used for extra verification by iBoot at startup to help ensure that it isn’t possible to start up an older Secure Enclave–signed AuxKC Image4 file with a newer LocalPolicy. An SHA384 hash of the AuxKC Image4 data structure and the kext receipt are included in the LocalPolicy. This receipt contains the list of kexts that were actually included in the AuxKC, because the set could be a subset of the UAKL if banned kexts were encountered. As part of the AuxKC construction, a kext receipt is also generated. This approach allows Permissive Security flows for developers or users who aren’t part of the Apple Developer Program to test kexts before they are signed.Īfter the AuxKC is created, its measurement is sent to the Secure Enclave to be signed and included in an Image4 data structure that can be evaluated by iBoot at startup. If SIP is disabled, the kext signature isn’t enforced. If System Integrity Protection (SIP) is enabled, the signature of each kext is verified before being included in the AuxKC. The kernel management daemon ( kmd) is then responsible for validating only those kexts found in the UAKL for inclusion into the AuxKC. The authorization used for the above flow is also used to capture an SHA384 hash of the user-authorized kext list (UAKL) in the LocalPolicy. The combination of the 1TR and password requirement makes it difficult for software-only attackers starting from within macOS to inject kexts into macOS, which they can then exploit to gain kernel privileges.Īfter a user authorizes kexts to load, the above User-Approved Kernel Extension Loading flow is used to authorize the installation of kexts. This action also requires entering an administrator password to authorize the downgrade. Kexts must be explicitly enabled for a Mac with Apple silicon by holding the power button at startup to enter into One True Recovery (1TR) mode, then downgrading to Reduced Security and checking the box to enable kernel extensions. Kernel extensions in a Mac with Apple silicon iPhone Text Message Forwarding security.How iMessage sends and receives messages.Adding transit and eMoney cards to Apple Wallet.Rendering cards unusable with Apple Pay.Adding credit or debit cards to Apple Pay.How Apple Pay keeps users’ purchases protected.Intro to app security for iOS and iPadOS.Protecting access to user’s health data.How Apple protects users’ personal data.Activating data connections securely in iOS and iPadOS.Protecting user data in the face of attack.Protecting keys in alternate boot modes.Encryption and Data Protection overview.UEFI firmware security in an Intel-based Mac.Additional macOS system security capabilities.recoveryOS and diagnostics environments.Contents of a LocalPolicy file for a Mac with Apple silicon.LocalPolicy signing-key creation and management.Boot process for iOS and iPadOS devices.Secure intent and connections to the Secure Enclave.Face ID, Touch ID, passcodes, and passwords.
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